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SSRN
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Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms

SSRN Electronic Journal
2013
  • 57
    Citations
  • 7,378
    Usage
  • 102
    Captures
  • 1
    Mentions
  • 0
    Social Media
Metric Options:   Counts1 Year3 Year

Metrics Details

  • Citations
    57
    • Citation Indexes
      53
    • Policy Citations
      4
      • Policy Citation
        4
  • Usage
    7,378
    • Abstract Views
      6,015
    • Downloads
      1,363
  • Captures
    102
  • Mentions
    1
    • Blog Mentions
      1
      • Blog
        1
  • Ratings
    • Download Rank
      29,419

Article Description

This paper presents an overview of what economists can say about vertical constraints by multi-sided platforms at this stage in the development of our knowledge about the economics of these businesses. It describes the general procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of vertical restraints by multi-sided platforms. It then focuses on the role of critical mass for multi-sided platforms and how vertical restraints might be used on the one hand, anti-competitively to prevent rivals from achieving critical mass and long-term growth and, on the other hand, pro-competitively, to ensure the platform and its customers that the platform will remain viable.

Bibliographic Details

David S. Evans

Elsevier BV

vertical restraints; multi-sided platforms; antitrust; two-sided markets; abuse of dominance; monopolization; tying; exclusive dealing; bundled rebates; most favored nation clauses; critical mass

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