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The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets

SSRN Electronic Journal
2016
  • 8
    Citations
  • 630
    Usage
  • 0
    Captures
  • 0
    Mentions
  • 0
    Social Media
Metric Options:   Counts1 Year3 Year

Metrics Details

  • Citations
    8
    • Citation Indexes
      8
  • Usage
    630
    • Abstract Views
      553
    • Downloads
      77
  • Ratings
    • Download Rank
      635,750

Article Description

This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as combinatorial auctions, school choice, and course allocation. Interdependent values and multidimensional signals are allowed. Despite known negative results, a mechanism exists that is feasible, ex post individually rational, ex post incentive compatible, and asymptotically both efficient and envy-free. This mechanism is a special case of the generalized random priority mechanism (GRP), which always satisfies the first three properties. The asymptotic properties follow as a corollary of the main theorem: GRP approximates virtually any infinite-market mechanism in large finite markets.

Bibliographic Details

Tadashi Hashimoto

Elsevier BV

ex post incentive compatibility; random allocation; random priority; large market; rational expectations equilibrium; information aggregation

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