The Economics of Investor Protection: ISDS versus National Treatment
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2019
- 6Citations
- 1,637Usage
- 1Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
Investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) are supposed to protect foreign investors against domestic policies causing “unjustified” harm. This paper scrutinizes the effects of investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) and national treatment provisions in a two-period model where foreign investment is subject to domestic regulation and a holdup problem. It shows that ISDS can mitigate the holdup problem and increases aggregate welfare, but comes with additional regulatory distortions for the first period. A national treatment provision avoids these regulatory distortions, but implies entry distortions because it makes the holdup problem also apply to domestic firms. If the domestic regulatory framework applies to many domestic firms, a national treatment provision welfare-dominates ISDS.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85179523432&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2752375; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2752375; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2752375; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2752375; https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752375
Elsevier BV
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