Who Seeks Quasi-Rents at the Shutdown Point?
SSRN Electronic Journal
2016
- 1Citations
- 1,152Usage
- 1Captures
Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
It is rational for a profit-maximizing firm, Firm A, to discontinue production when the price of its output falls below the shutdown point. Firm A’s suppliers might, however, still lobby the government to rescue the firm, in what I call quasi-rent-seeking behavior. This is because part of Firm A’s variable cost is quasi-rent income from the perspective of its suppliers of services of specific production factors. The quasi-rents would disappear if Firm A went out of business, and they would not be fully replaced because the net returns to the specific production factors are low in their alternative uses. The suppliers of Firm A might thus have the incentive to use the political process to preserve the quasi-rents even though the owners of Firm A are indifferent to such attempts.
Bibliographic Details
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know