The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068, Vol: 2017, Issue: 079
2017
- 3Citations
- 835Usage
- 12Captures
- 1Mentions
Metric Options: CountsSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Most Recent News
FEDS 2017-057: A Collateral Theory of Endogenous Debt Maturity(Revised)
Quantitative easing and bank risk taking: evidence from lending (PDF) Abstract: We empirically assess the effect of reserve accumulation as a result of quantitative easing
Article Description
In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment in which thrifts in several states witnessed an exogenous reduction in supervisory attention to assess the effect of supervision on financial institutions' willingness to take risk. We show that the affected institutions took on much more risk than their unaffected counterparts in other districts that were subject to identical regulations. Subsequent to the emergency enlistment of examiners and supervisors from other parts of the country two years later, additional risk taking by the affected thrifts ceased. We find that the expansion in risk taking resulted in a higher incidence of failure as well as more costly failures. None of these patterns are present in commercial banks subject to a different primary supervisory agent but otherwise similar to the thrifts in our sample.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85116386698&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/feds.2017.079; https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017079pap.pdf; https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/the-effect-of-bank-supervision-on-risk-taking-evidence-from-a-natural-experiment.htm; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029729; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029729
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know