The Impact of Juror Knowledge of Deductibility and Defendants’ Tax Rates on Punitive Damages Awards: Experimental Evidence
SSRN Electronic Journal
2021
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- 1,732Usage
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- 2Mentions
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Article Description
The US Tax Code allows corporate defendants to treat punitive damages as a deductible expense. Legal scholars argue that tax-unaware jurors fail to recognize that deductibility significantly reduces defendants’ after-tax punishment, leading to an under-punishment problem. They propose that explicitly informing jurors about tax-deductibility could mitigate this problem. We conduct an experiment to test this claim. Compared to a control group of jurors who are told nothing about taxes, jurors who learn about tax-deductibility award higher damages when the defendant’s effective tax rate (ETR) is low, but not when ETR is high. Our results highlight the cost of tax avoidance (low ETRs) for firms in a previously unexamined setting. Our findings suggest that allowing jurors to consider tax-deductibility leads to higher damages only under a narrow set of circumstances, offering limited support for the under-punishment hypothesis. Our results should be of interest to scholars in accounting, law, and public policy.
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