The Miba/Zollern Case on a Ministerial Approval: European Champions Instead of Competition?
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2019
- 953Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
In the current case concerning the ministerial approval of Miba and Zollern, the applicant companies used already known but also new justifications in order to demonstrate public interest advantages of the anti-competitive merger. We examine these reasons for their economic-theoretical foundation and conclude that the Federal Minister of Economics should join the vote of the Monopolies Commission and not grant permission. Furthermore, we recommend a fundamental revision of the instrument in order to be able to justify its continued existence.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85113087420&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403570; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3403570; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403570; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403570; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403570
Elsevier BV
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