Pay to Play in Investment Management
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2019
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- 4Captures
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
This study investigates the pervasiveness of pay to play in U.S. public pensions. We document a strong positive and statistically significant relation between the presence of government clients for an investment advisory firm and past owner and officer donations to influential state politicians. We use the adoption of SEC Rule 206(4)-5 which prohibited pay to play activities as a quasi-experiment. Prior to rule adoption, advisors that donate have nearly twice the percentage of public pensions in their client base relative to non-donor advisors. We observe a precipitous decline in donations made by advisors catering to public pension plans post-rule enactment.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85115050182&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446357; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3446357; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446357; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3446357; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446357
Elsevier BV
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