Board Connections and CEO Successions
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2020
- 3Citations
- 2,259Usage
- 6Captures
Metric Options: Counts1 Year3 YearSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
This paper studies the effects of connections between CEO candidates and board members on CEO succession decisions. CEO candidates’ prior connections with the hiring board increase their probability of being hired. These connections also affect post-succession firm performance. Connections reduce CEO labor market frictions and improve succession efficiency, especially in outside successions. They, however, distort director incentives and lead to inefficient succession decisions when internal governance is weak. Further, board connectedness to candidates can shape firms’ decisions to hire from the outside and reduce uncertainties. Overall, board connections provide information benefits but also raise agency concerns.
Bibliographic Details
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85112352996&origin=inward; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551748; https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3551748; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551748; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3551748; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3551748
Elsevier BV
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