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Wholesale Pricing with Asymmetric Information About the Quality of a Private Label

SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2023
  • 0
    Citations
  • 162
    Usage
  • 0
    Captures
  • 0
    Mentions
  • 0
    Social Media
Metric Options:   Counts1 Year3 Year

Metrics Details

  • Usage
    162
    • Abstract Views
      137
    • Downloads
      25

Article Description

This article presents a mechanism design analysis of the optimal wholesale tariff proposed by the monopolistic manufacturer of a branded product to a monopolistic retailer if the retailer also sells a private label whose quality is unobserved by the brand manufacturer. While prior literature had suggested that the manufacturer potentially forecloses the private label in an alternative situation with asymmetric information about aggregate demand, the present model suggests a markedly different result: The manufacturer optimally requires the retailer to sell \textit{too much} of the competing private label.

Bibliographic Details

Johannes Paha

Elsevier BV

Multidisciplinary; Asymmetric information; branded product; market share contract; Mechanism Design; private label product

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