Wholesale Pricing with Asymmetric Information About the Quality of a Private Label
SSRN, ISSN: 1556-5068
2023
- 162Usage
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Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Article Description
This article presents a mechanism design analysis of the optimal wholesale tariff proposed by the monopolistic manufacturer of a branded product to a monopolistic retailer if the retailer also sells a private label whose quality is unobserved by the brand manufacturer. While prior literature had suggested that the manufacturer potentially forecloses the private label in an alternative situation with asymmetric information about aggregate demand, the present model suggests a markedly different result: The manufacturer optimally requires the retailer to sell \textit{too much} of the competing private label.
Bibliographic Details
Elsevier BV
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