A Model of China's Economic Vertical Structure
2024
- 221Usage
Metric Options: CountsSelecting the 1-year or 3-year option will change the metrics count to percentiles, illustrating how an article or review compares to other articles or reviews within the selected time period in the same journal. Selecting the 1-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year. Selecting the 3-year option compares the metrics against other articles/reviews that were also published in the same calendar year plus the two years prior.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Example: if you select the 1-year option for an article published in 2019 and a metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019. If you select the 3-year option for the same article published in 2019 and the metric category shows 90%, that means that the article or review is performing better than 90% of the other articles/reviews published in that journal in 2019, 2018 and 2017.
Citation Benchmarking is provided by Scopus and SciVal and is different from the metrics context provided by PlumX Metrics.
Paper Description
A general equilibrium model is developed to highlight the vertical structure of China's economy, namely that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) monopolize key upstream industries while downstream industries are largely open to private competition. We show how the upstream SOEs extract rents from the liberalized downstream industries in the process of industrialization and globalization, which helps explain why the profitability of SOEs exceeded that of non-SOEs around 2000. Moreover, we show how the vertical structure hinders industrialization, reduces GDP, and harms public welfare. Counterfactual analyses using China's firm-level data from 1998 to 2007 confirm that the upstream SOE monopoly has a significant negative effect on output and welfare, and that this monopoly is more harmful than preferential credit subsidies. We also show how the vertical structure emerges as an equilibrium outcome and how this model framework can be useful for countries beyond China.
Bibliographic Details
Provide Feedback
Have ideas for a new metric? Would you like to see something else here?Let us know